Specter of Reason

There are various issues that I'd like to address regarding the 2013 Isaac Asimov Memorial Debate , but one in particular is bugging me.  Lawrence Krauss says that science can give us a plausible explanation of how a universe like ours could spontaneously "pop into existence" out of timeless, spaceless, lawless void.  Jim Holt says that Krauss is talking nonsense:  The idea of a universe "popping into existence" implies that there is a point in time in which that event occurs.  Yet, by Krauss' definition, there is no time (or space) for the universe to pop into.  I think Holt's point is valid, but it does not get resolved. Here's the whole exchange (starting @ 0:50:00): Krauss: Quantum mechanics says things fluctuate, and if gravity is a theory of space and time, if you make space and time quantum mechanical variables, then it is perfectly possible for universes to pop into existence--space and time to pop into existence where there was no space ...

I wasn't able to watch the live stream of the 2013 Isaac Asimov Memorial Debate.  I'm looking forward to seeing the full video when it is available online.  For now, I've found a review of the event at Engspurdishabic .  Unsurprisingly, the debate had a very philosophical dimension.  Issues concerning the definition of the word "nothing", the metaphysical implications of nothingness and the boundaries between science and other disciplines were all discussed.  It's just the sort of stuff you'd like a professional philosopher or two to weigh in on.  Alas, none were on hand .  Also worth noting:  It appears that Lawrence Krauss compared their amateur philosophizing to the works of Mozart.  (That's not true.  See update below.)   I'm sure I will have more to say about this event once I see the video for myself. Thanks to Russell Blackford for pointing out that my initial phrasing was misleading.  I did not mean to imply that Krau...

Thanks in large part to my recent email correspondence with L. A. Paul (see here and  here  for some background on that), I've formulated a position which, as far as I know, is novel in the philosophy of mind.  The basic assumption is this: (1) One knows *about* what it is like to X iff one knows some of the consequences and/or functional correlations associated with the experience of what it is like to X.   It follows that,  (2) one can know about what it is like to X without ever directly experiencing X.   This only requires that phenomenal properties have functional correlations (these can be statistical or accidental, and not intrinsic, of course) and/or that they are not epiphenomenal.  This is consistent with the common intuition that you can only know what it is like to X if you have some experience of X-ing.  (That is the new-knowledge intuition associated with Frank Jackson's Mary thought experiment:  When Mary the ...

I want to take a closer look at L. A. Paul's argument that The Decision (whether or not to have children) is not rational.  In my last post , I claimed her argument is not clearly valid.  I want to explain why.  Her argument can be represented by this series of propositions: 1) If The Decision is rational, then it involves people who have never had children comparing what it would be like to have children with what it would be like to remain childless. 2) People who have never had children cannot know what it would be like to have children. 3) If a person cannot know what it would be like to have children, then they cannot compare what it would be like to have children with what it would be like to remain childless. 4) People who have never had children cannot compare what it would be like to have children with what it would be like to remain childless. 5) Therefore, The Decision is not rational. On the surface, it looks like you must accept (4) and (5) if you ac...