Specter of Reason

This is the latest in my email correspondence with Professor Torin Alter, who specializes in the philosophy of mind. Dear Torin, I'm not going to respond to all of the issues raised in our previous exchanges. I would, for example, like to discuss the issue of operational definitions and your discomfort with my a priori approach to physicalism. But I'll put those topics off for a possible future time. For now, I've decided to construct a new argument about phenomenal knowledge which may help clear a path towards mutual understanding. I checked out your paper, “ Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience ,” as you suggested, and I would like to begin by quoting its opening sentences: “Phenomenal knowledge usually comes from experience. For example, I know what it’s like to see red because I have done so.” The meaning of the phrase "phenomenal knowledge" is not obvious, which may be one reason why so many papers are written about it. One thing seems clear enough to...

The following is a slightly improved version of a post I recently contributed to the PhilPapers discussion forum . It is a response to Alvin Plantinga's "Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism ." I do not know how much serious discussion among professional philosophers has been devoted to Plantinga's argument, though I know it is widely heralded by many non-professionals who do not like evolutionary theory. Plantinga wants to use evolutionary theory to attack naturalism, but his argument fails on epistemological grounds. His error is two-fold. First, he fails to state his general epistemological position, and so leaves us wondering what he means by "truth." Second, and more detrimental to his argument, he fails to consider the possibility of epistemological behaviorism, which I take to be the most robust and compelling approach to epistemology (following the work of Peirce, Dewey, Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, and Rorty, to name but a few). Consider ...