What a theological noncognitivist can say

Imagine a community called Storyville, where there are no religious institutions per se, but where various stories are circulated which we would call "religious."  Let's say these are stories from the Bible, such as the story of Job.  In Storyville, the questions might arise:  Are these stories based on facts?  Do they represent some features of the world or our history?  Does the character of Job represent a real person who lived some time in the past?  Does the character of God represent a real person who lived in the past?

A denizen of Storyville might respond, "Job may have been a real person, but what sort of person could God have been?  I don't think God sounds like a person at all.  Is God supposed to represent some abstract quality or force of nature?  Maybe God is supposed to be both:  a person, but also some other kind of force of nature, or some quality inherent in nature.  It doesn't seem to make sense, but it's just a story, so it doesn't matter."

This denizen of Storyville is only talking about whether or not a character in a story is supposed to represent something (or things), and what sorts of things that character might be intended to represent.  They do not have a coherent idea of what the character is supposed to represent, if it supposed to represent anything at all.  All they have are ideas about what it may or may not represent.  And those ideas are coherent:  For it is coherent to talk about people, forces of nature and qualities inherent in the natural world.

Nothing our denizen of Storyville has said contradicts the view known as theological noncognitivism, which is the view that theological language has no cognitive content--that is, that theological concepts do not denote anything at all (not even possible objects) and have no logical sense (which does not stop theology from having emotional appeal and other forms of currency).  Thus, I suppose that this denizen could be a theological noncognitivist.

Now let another denizen of Storyville comment:  "I think God exists.  God is real, and not just a fictional character."  Theology has thus surfaced.

The first denizen responds with skepticism:  "What sort of being is God, then?  Is God a person and a quality inherent in nature?  How does that even make sense?"

"I don't know, but I feel it in my heart that he exists.  Don't you believe in God?"  Religion has thus entered Storyville through a social pressure to adopt theological language.

Now the first denizen is annoyed.  "How can I believe in God when I don't even know what sort of thing God is supposed to be?  Without a coherent definition of "God," I can't believe in God."  Our first denizen sounds very ignostic.

"Ah, so then you can't say you don't believe in God, either."

Our skeptic responds, "Sort of.  It's true that I can't say I have any beliefs about God if I don't know what God is supposed to be.  But I certainly don't believe I have any beliefs about anything called God.  Hmm.  Maybe I do.  Is God that bushel of strawberries over there?  If that's God, then I certainly do have beliefs about him.  I believe he's yummy!  But since I don't know if the character of God is supposed to represent that bushel of strawberries, I don't know whether or not I think God is yummy."  

"So you can't say anything about God at all, right?" 

"Well, I can say that God, as a character in a story, may or may not be meant to represent some real quality or aspect of nature, or some person.  And I can say that I don't believe it does represent anything at all.  But if there really is something it represents, if there really is something real called God:  I still have no idea what that's supposed to be.  It seems incoherent to me.  I don't think there's really anything there to talk about at all.  I think it's just a story.  God doesn't exist."

So my view is this.  Our skeptical denizen of Storyville, who ends by denying the existence of God, is a theological noncognitivist.  Even though the word "God" is used, the theological noncognitivist denies that the word "God" has a coherent meaning, apart from naming a character in some stories.  This does not prevent the theological noncognitivist from talking about that character or what that character might (or might not) represent.  It does not prevent the theological noncognitivist from denying that the character represents anything at all.  Theological noncognitivists can be strong skeptics about the truth of Biblical stories without assuming that the word "God" in those stories is coherently defined.  The last line, "God doesn't exist," just means that the word "God" names a character in some stories, and not a real entity or property of the world.  I think a theological noncognitivist can say that.

(See Theological Noncognitivism, Redux for a more thorough discussion of my point of view.)

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

An Argument For Compatibilism

Compatibilism is the idea that there is no conflict between determinism and free will.  Incompatibilism is the idea that free will cannot exist in a deterministic universe.  There's been a lot of discussion over which view is correct.  What's remarkable about the debate isn't so much the stubbornness or passion which has been exhibited by this or that party, but the fact that the very terms of the debate are controversial.  There is a great deal of confusion about what the key issues in the debate are and how we should be talking about them.  As a result, there is a meta-debate within the debate itself.  You cannot engage in the debate without also engaging in a debate about the debate--about what issues are at stake and about how the issues should be framed.  So here's what I want to do:  I want to explain why I think incompatibilists are doing a very bad job of framing the debate, and also why compatibilism is the most reasonable option on the t...
Read more

Sam Harris and the Moral Realism/Moral Relativism Myth

There is a popular misconception that, if you are not a moral realist, you are a moral relativist. Yet, most non-theistic professional philosophers may be neither. As I'll explain, I prefer a variety of anti-realism called moral noncognitivism. First, I want to discuss the moral realism/moral relativism myth. Moral realists believe in objective truths about right and wrong, whereas moral relativists believe that moral truths are subjective, or limited by the beliefs and values of particular communities and cultures. Moral relativists are people who say, for example, that genital mutilation isn't absolutely or universally wrong--it's just wrong for some people. Moral realists respond, "No, genital mutilation really is [or, perhaps, really isn't] wrong, for all people and all times--all things being equal." This is usually how the issue is framed in popular culture, particularly in debates over atheism and the role of religion in society. It is not uncommo...
Read more

Luke Skywalker and Rey: Comparing Character Arcs

My second viewing of The Force Awakens only reinforced my admiration.  I'm very impressed by Rey as a character, and so I want to respond to the prevalent criticism that she does not have a satisfying character arc.  I think she stands up better than many people think.  To prove it, let's compare her arc to Luke's in the original Star Wars, Episode 4: A New Hope.   Luke and Rey each have two inner conflicts dealing with the themes of loyalty and trust, but in Rey's case, the conflicts converge and are developed in a more dramatic and I think satisfying way. At the start of Episode IV: A New Hope , Luke wants to be loyal to his aunt and uncle, but also wants to follow his own dreams.  This is his first inner conflict.  His dreams are somewhat vague at first: He wants to get off Tatooine, join the academy, be heroic, etc.  When Ben Kenobi tells him his father was a Jedi Knight killed by Darth Vader, his motivation becomes more focused: He wants to joi...
Read more