Specter of Reason

That's the title of a recent paper I just read by Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa (Journal of Consciousness Studies  19, pp. 67-95; H/T ex-apologist ).  It's an interesting and mostly very clear paper, at least for me, who has not read most of the source material they are discussing.  (They're primarily drawing on Chalmers, Stoljar and Pereboom.) I was most surprised (and pleased) to see that Chalmers has made a significant qualification about the implications of the Knowledge and Conceivability Arguments.  I used to think he believed those arguments entailed the falsity of physicalism.  However, Chalmers now claims that they only entail the following disjunction:  Either physicalism is false or Russellian Monism is true.  Since there can be varieties of physicalism which are compatible with Russellian Monism, then Chalmers must be open to the possibility of physicalism. Chalmers apparently accepts (or perhaps only strongly leans towards) a variety...

In my last post , I argued that the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument are incompatible, which is interesting if only because they are commonly supported together in attacks against physicalism. Torin Alter has just emailed me saying that Mary Z has appeared in the literature already, and even in an argument similar to--though perhaps not identical with--my own (see McGeer, 2003). I haven't read his references, so I cannot comment on any of that yet. What I want to do here is defend my incompatibility argument against possible objections, including one raised in Torin Alter's email. First, a brief review of the incompatibility argument: If zombies are conceivable, then we can conceive of Mary Z, a zombie version of the original Mary (hereafter 'Mary O'). If zombies are conceivable, then Mary Z gains knowledge when she leaves her black-and-white room. If zombies are conceivable, then Mary Z's new knowledge does not entail non-physical facts. If z...

This is the latest in my email correspondence with Professor Torin Alter, who specializes in the philosophy of mind. Dear Torin, I'm not going to respond to all of the issues raised in our previous exchanges. I would, for example, like to discuss the issue of operational definitions and your discomfort with my a priori approach to physicalism. But I'll put those topics off for a possible future time. For now, I've decided to construct a new argument about phenomenal knowledge which may help clear a path towards mutual understanding. I checked out your paper, “ Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience ,” as you suggested, and I would like to begin by quoting its opening sentences: “Phenomenal knowledge usually comes from experience. For example, I know what it’s like to see red because I have done so.” The meaning of the phrase "phenomenal knowledge" is not obvious, which may be one reason why so many papers are written about it. One thing seems clear enough to...

I am extremely grateful to Professor Torin Alter, who specializes in the philosophy of mind. I emailed him my previous post on the knowledge argument , and he was kind enough to reply with some guidance and feedback. He informed me that other philosophers (including himself) have questioned P2. He also directed me towards avenues for further research, including his entry for The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism ." Then he showed even more generosity by engaging my ideas. Specifically, he corrected my error in regarding P2 as a stipulation, as opposed to an assumption (I have since corrected the mistake); and he expressed strong doubts about my claim regarding the inconceivability of omniscience. He suggested that the notion of omniscience might in fact be a valuable guiding principle for science. What follows is my response to Professor Alter. It is a defense of my views on omniscience and a more elaborate criticism of th...