Specter of Reason

Over at  Philosophy, et cetera ,  Richard Chappell  questions the common assumption that "one's metaethical views are more or less independent of one's first-order moral views."  Chappell says that moral anti-realists act as if people really mattered, because people do matter to them .  However, he says, that is not the same as believing that people matter in and of themselves.  Can anti-realists believe that people matter simpliciter ?  Sure, they can act as if they do, but that is not the same as really believing it.  If they don't really believe it, he says, then moral anti-realism may be morally suspect. There is a brief but interesting discussion in the comments section of Chappell's blog.  One good point which was raised is this:  An anti-realist need not recognize a difference between acting as if people deserve respect and really believing that they do.  In other words, anti-realists can be dispositionalists about belief. ...

Republican lawmakers in North Carolina want a state religion and are trying to fight for it by calling the interpretation of the Constitution into question .  Their argument looks valid, but I don't think it is sound. The first premise is the 10th Amendment of the United States Constitution: (1) The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. The second premise is this: (2) The power to determine what is or is not constitutional is not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States. If both of these premises are accepted, then the following conclusion seems inevitable: (3) The power to determine what is or is not constitutional is reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. As stated in their recently filed bill, Republicans in North Carolina draw this final conclusion: (4) "Eac...