Specter of Reason

In his arguments for a science of morality, Sam Harris relies heavily on the following analogy: well-being is to morality what health is to medicine. His claim is not simply that morality is a natural phenomenon which can be studied as rigorously as any other. Rather, it is that moral prescriptions can be as scientifically grounded as medical prescriptions. That there is no basic difference between a doctor giving a patient medicine and a moral scientist prescribing right conduct. Of course, when a doctor says, "take two and call me in the morning," she is, in a sense, prescribing right conduct. She is telling her patient what to do. More often than not, I think, the patient trusts her to give good medical advice. That is, the patient is listening to the doctor precisely because he wants to recover from some malady, and believes that the doctor knows how to help him get over it. The prescription would not be morally binding unless we were to suppose that people had a mor...

In my previous post I said "x ought to y" just means "if F(x,y), then x will foster x's dignity." [On second thought, since the moral "ought" implies an obligation, I think "x ought to y" rather means "if not-F(x,y), then x will not foster x's dignity."] This means that "we ought not foster our own dignity" is a logical absurdity. This might seem intuitively obvious to many people, but it might not be that easy to understand. Why is it absurd to say that somebody shouldn't foster their own dignity? Here's an attempt to answer that question, and also to work out some related knots. Dignity is what defines us as moral agents. The imperative "should" implies an appeal to one's sense of moral agency, and we cannot simultaneously appeal to and negate somebody's moral agency. So, when I say morality is the process of fostering dignity, I just mean it is the process of fostering moral a...

Sam Harris has responded to Russell Blackford's review --or, rather, to Jerry Coyne's summation of Russell's review--at Why Evolution Is True . I've joined the discussion with a number of elaborate comments. I'm reposting my most recent comment below (with slight modification), since I think it is of the most general interest, and because it develops some of my own ideas in interesting ways: About defining “morality,” I think there are two assumptions in play here: 1) Evolution has favored ways of thinking which promote general well-being. 2) What people call “morality,” though different in many details, is just those ways of thinking which promote general well-being. If we accepted these two premises, we could argue that what is moral is just what promotes general well-being. There is no sense in saying something could be moral without promoting general well-being, because the definition of “morality” doesn’t allow it. I think (1) is possibly ...

I've been discussing Sam Harris a bit at Russell Blackford's blog, Metamagician and the Hellfire Club . Russell's published a review of Sam's new book , The Moral Landscape , and he makes some very strong criticisms, all of which I agree with. Russell has also quite surprisingly and kindly drawn attention to me and Specter of Reason, even though he has suggested that I'm a bit too hard on Sam. I am indeed much more critical of Sam's recent work on moral philosophy. I cannot help but worry about popular attitudes towards atheism and philosophy, and I don't think New Atheism has always and only been of help. Don't get me wrong. The New Atheists have done a lot that is good. But they have also done some harm, and I'm worried about their overall direction. Sam's recent work (his public appearances as well as his new book) may be the worst so far. It strikes me as both arrogant and ignorant (a dangerous combination), and exploitative of the i...