Specter of Reason

My view is that there are no theoretical limits on what science can discover. To put it another way, there are no inherently undiscoverable facts. This is naturalism as I understand it. I think this is an a priori truth. It doesn't make sense to say that there are things that exist but which science cannot study. I know it seems like a perfectly reasonable thing to say; but when analyzed, it doesn't stands to reason. What it would mean is that there are facts which cannot be described by any process of describing facts. It would mean there were inherently indescribable facts. But facts are describable by definition. So it's a contradiction in terms. You can believe in the indescribable--you can believe in the supernatural--but not rationally. That's why people call it "faith." Wittgenstein wrote, "A nothing would do just as well as a something about which nothing could be said." The relevance is thus: When discussing what is possible

I've gotten involved in an interesting discussion of naturalism at Metamagician and the Hellfire Club . The discussion was instigated by the work of Richard Carrier, who is neither a philosopher nor a scientist, but a historian who writes about both. Unfortunately, I think he should probably stick to history. His attempt to define "naturalism" and "supernaturalism" is marked by fallacy and inconsistency. (Update: I point out several problems with his arguments in a comment attached to this post.) Carrier's definitions are as follows: "naturalism is true if everything that exists is causally reducible to the nonmental. . . . If naturalism is true, everything mental is caused by the nonmental, whereas if supernaturalism is true, at least one thing is not." Yet, naturalism and supernaturalism are not exclusively theses about minds or mental entities. For example, Carrier excludes the possibility of David Chalmers' variety of naturalis

I have been discussing dignity in personal terms, as what defines a person as such, and so with reference to self-awareness, self-worth, and self-respect. Yet, morality has an intrinsically social dimension. This might seem to create a tension in our understanding, though I don't think that should be the case. Rationality and personhood are normative concepts--they require communities. Dignity therefore cannot be defined from the inside, such that each person's dignity were a wholly subjective matter. Rather, personhood is defined through social interaction, through rational processes of negotiating differences. There could be no concept of person without the process of rational negotiation. So, when we have dignity--when we respect and value ourselves--we are understanding and defining ourselves through others. When we condemn or praise others with our own moral judgments, we are saying something about what it means to be a person. We are setting a standard for ourselv

Ronald A. Lindsay was kind enough to reply to my comment about the purpose of morality. (I claimed that the primary function of morality was to foster the dignity of persons--i.e., rational, self-aware agents.) He asked for some clarification of what I meant by "dignity," and also made some comments which reminded me that his primary concern is with establishing a methodology for resolving moral dilemmas. Here is the substance of my reply: I agree that it might be hard for people to accept my answer without a little discussion of what “dignity” means. I like the way Kant approaches it. He contrasts dignity with prices. Prices are relative values, and they are fixed to objects because those objects are means to ends. The value of an object is relative to the ends it serves. For Kant, dignity is the quality of being beyond comparative value. It is the quality of being an end in oneself. Persons are distinct from objects because they have dignity—they are ends in

Yesterday I came up with the notion that the primary function of morality is to foster dignity . I noted a relation between my idea and Kant's view of rational agents as ends in themselves, but I wasn't aware just how similar my view is to Kant's. Today, while doing a little reading about dignity, I found this passage from his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (edited and translated by Mary Gregor, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 42-43): In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity. What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market price; that which, even without presupposing a need, conforms with a certain taste, that is, with a delight in the mere purposeless play of our mental powers, has a fancy price; but that which constitutes the condition under w

Ronald A. Lindsay, of the Center for Inquiry, asks, What is the purpose of morality? Here's my answer: In my understanding, the primary function of morality is to foster the dignity of persons, which I would define as self-aware, rational agents. The principles underlying any such process or practice would, by definition, be moral principles. Any principles which do not foster the dignity of persons could not be considered moral. I didn't have this answer a few days ago, when I first read Lindsay's post. I had some vague idea that, from an evolutionary perspective, morality probably helps people function together. But that is too general to be of value. It doesn't get at what is unique to morality. Also, I was never persuaded by the idea that morality is functionally limited to any species, or any definable biological group. After all, we can have moral dilemmas about sentient robots. This is not to say that morality has no basis in evolutionary biology. It

Richard Brown, a CUNY Assistant Professor of Philosophy and author of the blog Philosophy Sucks! , recently shared some of his thoughts on the relationship between morality and emotions . I found it very stimulating and offered several observations and objections in the comments section. We'll see if any minds are changed. I'm posting the (cosmetically modified) content of my comments below. They're out of context here, of course, but I think my points are understandable: Jason Streitfeld , on June 17, 2010 at 2:58 pm Said: I’m not clear on how an emotion or sentiment could be correct. Either I feel something, or I do not. How does right or wrong enter into it? What if we say that moral judgments entail beliefs about the appropriateness of emotions and/or sentiments? For example, I have negative feelings about murder, and I believe that these feelings are appropriate–i.e., have a constructive role to play in the world . Jason Streitfeld , on June 18, 2

Brian Leiter has invited his readers to answer this question in 75 words or less. The original challenge was to do it in 50 words or less, but I guess Leiter thought that wasn't fair. In any case, I've just submitted the following 49-word answer to his blog: Philosophy is thinking about thinking. It explores the varieties and limits of thought and thinking things. It is therefore concerned with understanding the nature of knowledge, belief, intuition, propositions, judgments, facts, inferences, arguments, reasons, and justifications. To this end, it develops views of meaning, truth, validity, morality, possibility, and plausibility. Edited on June 7, 2010, to add a 50th word: "meaning."