Defending the Incompatibility Argument
In my last post , I argued that the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument are incompatible, which is interesting if only because they are commonly supported together in attacks against physicalism. Torin Alter has just emailed me saying that Mary Z has appeared in the literature already, and even in an argument similar to--though perhaps not identical with--my own (see McGeer, 2003). I haven't read his references, so I cannot comment on any of that yet. What I want to do here is defend my incompatibility argument against possible objections, including one raised in Torin Alter's email. First, a brief review of the incompatibility argument: If zombies are conceivable, then we can conceive of Mary Z, a zombie version of the original Mary (hereafter 'Mary O'). If zombies are conceivable, then Mary Z gains knowledge when she leaves her black-and-white room. If zombies are conceivable, then Mary Z's new knowledge does not entail non-physical facts. If z...