Stanley and Williamson's "Knowing How", Revisited
Last September, I defended Gilbert Ryle against Stanley and Williamson's "Knowing How" (2001). After reviewing Ryle, reading a good many papers on the topic, discussing some issues with a few professional philosophers (including an in-depth and spirited email exchange with Jason Stanley about how to interpret Ryle), I've come to the following conclusions, which I divide into two parts. The first addresses S&W's misrepresentation of Ryle. In the second, I develop extensive, original arguments against S&W's formulation of knowing-how as a species of knowing-that. 1.0) Stanley and Williamson (S&W) profoundly misinterpret Ryle. I stand by my original critique of the way they present Ryle's regress argument. Similar critiques are found in Hetherington (2006) and Sheiber (2003). Others (Noe 2005; Wiggins 2009) point out other ways in which S&W get Ryle wrong, though I do not think anyone has yet to identify the full extent to which S&W ...