Specter of Reason

This is the second email I just sent to Stevan Harnad. ( See here for an explanation .) Hello again, Here is the rest of my response. It includes a response to earlier points about Descartes and skepticism, as well as a couple of points about categorization and definitions. SH: " the category in question is color, not difference in color or shape." I don't see a difference here. Categories are based upon differences. The category of "color" implies perceived differences in color, or else it is meaningless. SH: “People no more need a definition of feeling than they need a definition of green.” On the one hand, you say an ostensive definition is sufficient. On the other hand, you say that no definition is necessary. Isn't that inconsistent? Some kind of definition is necessary. And people can define green. The category “green” is complemented by other colors. We can ostend green. You cannot provide an ostensive definition for what you mean by ...

Stevan Harnad is an accomplished professor, having founded and edited a respected academic journal, Behavioral And Brain Sciences . He is not a professional philosopher, but he has published articles related to cognitive science and he has a lot to say about feelings and consciousness. I've been engaging him in a discussion at the PhilPapers forum devoted to the explanatory gap . We've touched on side issues related to Descartes, skepticism, and categorization. I am continuing our discussion by email for now, at David Chalmers' suggestion. The following is the first of two emails I just sent Stevan. (The second email can be found here: "Discussion with Stevan Harnad, continued" .) Stevan, David Chalmers has suggested that I take our discussion to email. I hope you do not mind. More and more of my point-by-point responses to you have been rejected by the editorial board (i.e., Chalmers) on the grounds that they are too long and too detailed to be of gene...