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Showing posts with the label epistemology

Knowledge and Skill: the intersection of science, philosophy and common sense

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I. Can you become a great martial artist without breaking a sweat?  In this classic scene from the 1999 sci-fi film, The Matrix, Neo (played by Keanu Reeves) seems to learn Kung Fu by having the information uploaded directly to his brain. If you cannot view the video, here's what we see:  Computer monitors show simple, 3D images of a brain and a martial arts position.  The computer is plugged into Neo, who is strapped to a chair with his eyes closed.  Neo opens his eyes with a noticable exhale, blinks, turns to Morpheus (played by Laurence Fishburne), and says, "I know Kung Fu."  Morpheus leans in, intrigued, and replies, "Show me." Morpheus is not clearly convinced.  Perhaps he is not sure the upload was successful.  Or maybe Morpheus believes that the upload was successful, but that it was only part of the learning process.  The skill has not really been attained until it has been demonstrated. It doesn't matter what Morpheus thought. ...

Two Kinds Of Knowledge In Plato's Gorgias

Provoked by some Facebook posts by Jason Stanley (Yale) and an ensuing discussion with Jason and Michael Morris (Sussex), I've been arguing for a certain interpretation of Plato's distinction between medicine and cookery, or, more generally, between crafts and knacks.  By "crafts" we might take Plato to mean arts or skills, or perhaps even what today would be called "sciences."  The difficult question concerns what Plato means by "knacks," and whether or not they entail a particular kind of knowledge. In Gorgias (463a), Socrates refers to knacks as parts of flattery, which he calls "the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind."  In another translation, flattery is defined as "a shrewd, gallant spirit which has a natural bent for clever dealing with mankind."  Both translations indicate that flattery entails knowledge: either it is knowledge how to manage mankind, or it is whatever knowledge is required...

Counterfactual Statements of Fact

In "Are There Propositions?" (1929), Ryle interprets the word "proposition" as more or less synonymous with "statement." (See Ryle's  Collected Papers Volume 2: Collected Essays 1929-1968 , p. 39).  A logical result of this view is that propositional knowledge (aka "knowledge that") is knowledge related to statements of fact, linguistic or in other ways symbolic.  It would then follow that a person knows that x if and only if that person has some explicit recognition of the fact that x (via a representation of x), or the capacity to acknowledge or communicate that fact in some way. We can understand capacities in terms of counterfactual abilities.  Thus, if a person knows that x, that person can, in some situations, explicitly recognize, acknowledge or communicate that fact in some way.  In this way, propositional knowledge is tied intrinsically to intellectual and discursive capacities.  It's no wonder, then, that Ryle identifies propo...

Properly Basic Beliefs

A while back I got into a discussion of Plantinga's notion of properly basic beliefs with a philosopher who blogs under the suggestive pseudonym "exapologist."  I had thought the discussion had ended with one of my comments.  I was quite surprised this morning, almost two full years later, when I received a couple emails notifying me that exapologist had continued the discussion.  Since he doesn't show the dates of comments on his blog, I can't tell if the new comments are recent or several months old or what.  Could the notifications have taken almost two years to get to me?  Stranger things have surely happened in the online universe.  [Update: exapologist has informed me that his new comments were in fact made last night/this morning.]  In any case, I haven't done much research on the topic, and I never was any sort of authority on Plantinga, anyway, so my ability to contribute to the discussion is a bit limited.  With that disclaimer in hand,...

Epistemological Behaviorism and Plantinga

A while back I posted an argument against Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN) . At the time, I didn't do a whole lot of research about other arguments against EAAN, but I looked aroung a bit and didn't see anybody making the sort of argument that I was making. I let the topic go until just recently, when my interest in the subject was aroused by a discussion over at Russell Blackford's blog on a new book by Plantinga and Dennett . From what I can tell, the book is an extended version of a recorded debate between the two philosophers which took place a couple years ago. I haven't read the book, nor have I listened to more than the first fifteen minutes of the debate, so I won't speak about either directly. Still, EAAN is not new, and I don't think its formulation has changed significantly over the years. As I said, my interest was aroused. I've contributed a few lengthy posts over at Russell's blog, and I also did a littl...

Procedures and the A Priori

I want to flesh out the idea, which I expressed yesterday, that a priori knowledge is knowledge of rules which exist solely by virtue of knowledge of them, and which therefore is not justifiable in principle. The idea is a little obscure, but I think I can make it plainer. First, we have to recognize the distinction between propositional knowledge (representational knowledge, often called "knowledge that") and non-propositional knowledge (competence, often called "knowledge how"). A priori knowledge is not a matter of representational verisimilitude, but a matter of competence. Proceduralism is the view that mathematical truths express cognitive procedures. The equation "2+2=4" does not represent a fact which could be corroborated by empirical observation, but a procedure which exists solely by virtue of the minds which carry it out. In that sense, it is a rule which is known, but which exists solely by virtue of the fact that it is known--that there a...

Devitt and the A Priori

I've just looked at Michael Devitt's paper, " Naturalism and the A Priori ." He claims that epistemological naturalism cannot accommodate the a priori. According to epistemological naturalism, he says, all knowledge is justified by experience and nothing else. Since a priori knowledge is, by definition, knowledge which does not rely on empirical evidence for its justification (regardless of whether or not it is obtained by experience), then a priori knowledge is incompatible with epistemological naturalism. And since he is an epistemological naturalist, he claims there cannot be a priori knowledge. I won't go through all of his arguments, which are largely critical: he is primarily concerned with criticizing various arguments for the a priori, though he does lay out two arguments against it: the first is that the notion lacks motivation; the second is that it is too obscure to be taken seriously. (This latter argument reminds of one of Mackie's argument...

Two Views of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction?

I just reread this post of mine from June, 2008: The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction and The Knowledge Argument . My approach to the distinction is quite different from the one I presented ten days ago , but perhaps these two views are complementary. In the first post, I approach the distinction in epistemological terms. Analyticity and syntheticity are two different ways of testing the validity of the same propositions. They are different propositional attitudes--different knowledge relationships towards propositions. In my more recent post, I regard the distinction as a way of indicating different sorts of speech acts: one in which rules are stated and another in which predictions about the world are made. On the face of it, these are distinct ways of looking at the distinction, though they don't seem so far apart from each other. I'll have to think more about it to see if one entails the other. For now, I have to say that both views make sense to me, and I thi...

Gettier and the De Dicto / De Re Distinction

I want to discuss the difference between de dicto and de re beliefs and its implications for Gettier cases. This will be an elaboration on my earlier treatment of Gettier cases . I am mainly restating my argument in terms of the de dicto / de re distinction. Unfortunately, I have read very little of the literature on this distinction, so I cannot situate my arguments in a scholarly fashion. (Any pointers to relevant papers would be greatly appreciated.) The difference between de dicto and de re beliefs is sometimes illustrated with an example like this one: (1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy. There is an ambiguity in (1): Does Ralph believe of a specific individual that he is a spy? Or does Ralph believe that at least one person is a spy, without having a belief about any particular individual being a spy? If Ralph's belief is about a specific individual, then it is de re. If Ralph's belief is not about a specific individual, then it is de dicto. My contention is...

Getting Past Gettier

Larry Nemirow once told me that I should try to publish my good ideas wherever I can, and not wait until somebody else gets credit for them first. This apparently happened often to grad students. These days, it's a choice between waiting several months before getting a rejection letter (and, as a non-professional, I cannot expect anything other than rejection letters) or getting my ideas out in the open through my blog (or other online venues.) So that's what I'm gonna do now. Below is a very short paper I wrote which was rejected by a reputable philosophy journal a couple months ago. (I'm not sure why, but it seems better not to say which journal.) The editor-in-chief gave me some instructive comments--journals don't always do that, and I'm truly grateful. I'd like to spend a month or so researching and rewriting the paper, but I don't know when I'll have time to do that. In the meantime, maybe some readers can give me a few suggestions or cri...

Descartes Contra Wittgenstein

“It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then removed all these doubts.” --Ludwig Wittgenstein , Philosophical Investigations , section 87 I. I think, therefore I am Descartes' famous principle, cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am," also known simply as the cogito ), is probably the most widely known philosophical statement, and it is often considered to exemplify the only thing one can know for certain: that one exists. The cogito might be considered an instance of modus ponens : "If I am thinking, then I exist; I am thinking, therefore I exist." However, Jaako Hintikka ( 1962 ) compellingly argues that Descartes' cogito ergo sum is not a logical inference at all, but a performative act: that a certain cognitive act instantiates direct knowledge of one's existence--that the act of thinking make...