What Zombie Mary Knows
As I mentioned in my last post , Torin Alter alerted me to the fact that Victoria McGeer (2003) makes an argument about Zombie Mary which is similar to my own. I emailed McGeer and she was kind enough to send me a copy of her paper. It is not as similar to my argument as I was expecting, but we do cover some of the same ground. She makes strong use of Zombie Mary, though she does not construct an incompatability argument. Her aim is rather to show that (1) the knowledge argument relies on the very modal intuition it was supposed to establish, and (2) the knowledge argument is implausible. I will discuss her main arguments below, and I will also discuss some related issues. First, McGeer makes a very important point about David Chalmers' position in this whole affair. Chalmers (1996) observes that the modal intuition--the intuition that zombies are conceivable--entails that zombies make judgments just like human beings do. This follows from the fact that judgment...