More On The Modal (Anti-)Ontological Argument
Exapologist was kind enough to inform me that my objection to Plantinga's modal ontological argument (MOA) is similar to one made by Peter Van Inwagen. I've just read Van Inwagen's argument, which can be found in the sixth chapter of his celebrated Metaphysics . I don't think his argument is strong enough, as I will explain. The MOA aims to show that belief in God is just as rational as believing that God is possible. This would be an interesting result, since belief in God is widely regarded as less rational than belief in the mere possibility of God. So if the MOA is valid, it would be very interesting. What I have shown is that the argument is not valid. It begs the question. I show this by drawing attention to the premise that God's non-existence is possible. That premise is just as plausible as the premise of the MOA, and yet it contradicts the conclusion of the MOA. The defeat is therefore profound. All the MOA really shows...